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INTRODUCTION 
DETERMINANTS OF PER CAPITA MILITARY 
EXPENDITURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Robert E. Looney 
A large descriptive literature of the burden of military 
expenditures in developing countries has accumulated over 
the last several years. Understandably, the main thrust of 
most of this analysis concerns the loss in social welfare 
associated with increases in military expenditure per 
capita, i.e., that social expenditures in lieu of military 
expenditure would have provided more tangible improvements 
in the quality of life of large groups of individuals in 
developing countries. Without questioning this view, the 
analysis below attempts to determine the major factors 
underlying military expenditure per capita in developing 
countries. 
surprisingly, no previous studies have attempted to 
determine whether or not per capita military expenditures 
were related to anything except per capita income. The 
usual presumption being that military expenditures are in 
large part a function of political or strategic factors, 
with economi.c variables playing a tangential role. 
The departure of this paper is that it attempts to: 
1. verify the validity of Wagner's Law which states 
military expenditures per capita increase 
increased per capita income; 
that 
with 
2. Examine the role of public external debt in affecting 
military expenditures in developing countries, i.e., 
did the rapid increase in LDC external borrowing in the 
1970s play a significant role; 
3. Test the uniformity of military expenditures in 
developing countries to see whether developing 
countries as a group experience the same underlying 
factors which contribute to military expenditures or 
whether certain patterns of military expenditures are 
unique to particular sub-groupings of countries; 
4. Test the degree to which economic variables alone can 
account for the differences in per capita military 
expenditures across a wide group of diverse developing 
countries; 
Hopefully, .answers to these questions will provide new 
information as to the real burdens of military expenditures 
in developing countries and the mechanisms through which 
military expenditures are likely to increase in the future. 
FACTOR AND DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
with reference to the third question posed above, several 
studies [l) have indicated that developing countries may 
lack homogeneity with regard to the impact that defence 
expenditures have on the overall economic growth o~ the 
country. With regard to the impact of defence expenditures 
on economic growth, Frederiksen and Looney contend that [2): 
one can argue that under certain circumstances defence 
spending can help growth while under a different set of 
circumstances, it can hinder g~owth. Indeed, both 
propositions are likely to be true for the same country 
at different points in time. 
On the positive side, defence spending may contribute 
to the growth of the civilian economy by: (1) feeding, 
clothing and housing a number of people who would 
otherwise have to be fed, housed and clothed by the 
civilian economy, (2) providing education and medical 
care as well as vocational and technical training, (3) 
engaging in a variety of public works - roads, dams, 
river improvements, airports, communication networks, 
etc - that may in part serve civilian uses, and (4) 
engaging in scientific and technical specialitie~ ~h~ch 
would otherwise have to be performed by civilian 
personnel. 
They add that on the negative side [3): 
There are at least three different types of possible 
effects. The first, named the "income shift• by 
Benoit, is that increases in defence expenditures will 
reduce the civilian GDP and will thus tend to decrease 
growth proportionately. second, it is poss~ble that 
defence spending adversely affects growth since the 
government sector for the most part exh~b~ts 
•negligible rates of measurable productivity 
increases.• Finally, growth can suffer since increased 
spending on defence uses resources which could have 
been better employed as civilian investment. 
Frederiksen and Looney [4) note that while these 
arrangements make intuitive sense, the crucial determinant 
of the impact of defence expenditures on economic gr~wth is 
the country's financial resource constraint. According. to 
them, a country which is severely resource constrained 
(i.e., faces some combination of lagging taxes, reduced 
private and government savings, reduced oorrowing power 
overseas, export shortfalls, etc.) will probably face budget 
cuts. In order to maintain defence programs, the high 
grow;h development programs will be sacrificed [5): 
This is likely for two reasons. First, it is usually 
more politically acceptable to curtail capital 
invest~ent (on infrastructure, for example) than 
expenditures on t~e curr:n~ account. second, given 
th~t a well-esta~lished military establishments already 
exists, there will be the obvious pressure to maintain 
~he statu~ quo. .These ~pecial interest groups might 
include high ranking officers, military contractors 
and certain political groups. As budgets are reduced' 
the military share is frozen and the brunt of th~ 
de~lationary policy is borne by development projects 
which we assume are relatively productive. In short, 
d:fe~ce expenditures are likely to be asymmetric 
difficult to cut back but easily expanded. Thus, for 
resou~ce-constr~ined. countries, we should expect a 
negati~e relationship between defence spending and the 
economic growth. 
The au~hors.contend that the opposite is likely to hold for 
countries with a relative abundance of financial resources -
an elastic supply of tax revenues, a high inflow of foreign 
exchange and the like [6): 
These countries can more easily afford the capital 
investment programs necessary for economic growth 
while maintaining or even increasing defence programs. 
They concluded that [7): 
If this thesis if correct, one can see why previous 
authors have failed to find any consistency between 
economic growth and defence. Using a model based on 
resourc: constraints, however, it is easy to see why 
developing countries with identical levels of defence 
s~ending can experience very different growth levels: 
richer countries are apparently able to invest in 
develo~ment programs while, on the other hand, poorer 
countries have had to sacrifice these programs to pay 
for defence. 
• 
Sin9e their hypothesised relationship between defence and 
economic growth depended on financial resource constraints, 
their sample of developing countries was separated into 
either a resource-constrained or non resource-constrained 
group by means of cluster analysis. While a large number of 
conceivable proxy measures could be used to indicate the 
relative abundance or scarcity of financial resources the 
selection of those used in the cluster analysis was ba~ed on 
the r~tios of gross domestic investments to GDP in 1960 and 
1978 and the ratios of gross domestic savings to GDP in 1960 
and 1978. {Data taken from the 1980 world Bank 
world DevelopmeE!_B~!l·l The cluster analysis produced 
two distinct groups: one having high levels of savings and 
investment to GDP, the other having low ratios of savings 
and investment to GOP. 
Linear regression equations were estimated for each group 
[ 8]: 
·-· 
The most striking result and one that supports our 
hypothesis, is that the coefficient of the defence 
variable was positive and statistically significant at 
the 99 per cent level for the richer group. While the 
coefficient for the defence variables for the poorer 
group was negative { as hypothesised) it was not 
statistically different from zero. 
Based on the above-cited results it makes sense to split the 
sample of developing countries into groups based on some 
measure of resource constraint. Presumably, those countries 
who have either more domestic re~ources (savings and 
investments) or more access to foreign capital {everything 
else equal, such as gross national product) will be able to 
support a higher level of defence expenditures. On the 
other hand, those countries with a lower level of domestic 
resources or less access to international capital will 
(everything else equal) not have as high a level of defence 
expenditures. 
using factor analysis with number of measures of debt and 
capital flows (Table 1), the main trends in the data were 
identified and a discriminant analysis [9] was then 
performed using as variables those with the highest loading 
on each one of the individual factors. The orthogonal 
rotation assures that each variable selected had a 
relatively low degree of correlation with the others in the 
sample. The variables thus selected for splitting the two 
groups were: 
1. Gross Inflow of public Loans/Exports 1982 
2. Total public External oebt 1982 
3. Gross International Reserves 1982 
• 
4. public External oebt as a percentage of GDP 1982 
5. Growth in Imports 1970-82 
6. External Debt service as a percentage of GDP 1982 
7. public External Debt as a percentage of GDP 1970 
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Group l Group I 
--P-robao11ity IYrooabiTI t Y Country 
of Correct Country of Correct 
Placement Placement 
l Israel 69·34 l Greece 57·7B 
2 Honduras 83·48 2 India 84•91 
3 Cameroon 60·73 3 Nigeria 89·07 
4 Sudan 66·47 4 Indonesia 90·67 
5 Costa Rica 92·64 5 Eqypt 68·20 
6 Bolivia 86·27 6 Korea 89·95 
7 Somalia 86·46 7 Rwanda 69·0B 
8 Tunisia 68·31 8 Turkey 66·95 
9 Morocco 73·06 9 Spain 51 •89 
10 Guatemala 54·91 10 Venezuela 80·26 
11 Malawi 91·40 11 Mexico 99·69 
12 El Salvador 65·90 12 Brazil 99·02 
13 Mali 97·12 13 Algeria . 76·44 
14 Pakistan 86·98 14 Philippines 55·78 
15 Paraguay 60·02 15 Libya 75·69 
16 Ecuador 56·61 16 Colombia 54•63 
1 7 Dominican Republic 74·12 17 Thailand 60·95 
18 Liberia 94·77 18 Malayasia 65·16 
19 Ivory Coast 84·42 19 Argentina 66·09 
20 Mauritania 96·04 20 Saudi Arabia 94·65 
21 Sierra Leone 86·05 21 Kuwait 81 ·31 
22 Panama 94·37 22 Syria 63·95 
23 Chile 70·09 23 Jordan 50•81 
24 Chad 87·18 
25 Uruguay 67·87 
26 Tanzania 79·87 
27 Uganda 88·76 
28 Ethiopia 70·24 
29 Cen. African Rep. 76·89 
30 Ghana 78·72 
31 Burma 82·91 
32 Sri Lanka 75·39 
33 Jamaica 90·66 
34 Trinidad 77·62 
35 Zambia 95·88 
36 Peru 71·67 
37 Zimbabwe 85·68 
38 )<enya 86·61 
high degree of probability of correct placement in e 
group, i.e., the discriminating variables selected from 
factor analysis are able to split the sample countries i 
two fairly distinct groupings based largely on the exter 
debt situation facing each set of countries. The Group 
countries consist of several major oil exporters and seve1 
of 'the more dynamic newly industrialising nations such 
Mexico, Greece, India, Korea, Spain, Algeria and Malays, 
Group I countries in general seem to be the poorer, lE 
economically dynamic nations, this group being heavi 
weighted with African and poorer Latin American countries. 
Further insight into 
examining the means 
discriminant analysis: 
the 
Of two groups can be gained the variables used in t 
1. Group I countries resorted to a much higher (3.6 time 
inflow of external public loans in 1982 relative 
their exports that year; 
2. On the other hand, the overall level of total publ: 
external debt in 1982 averages nearly four and one ha: 
times as much for Group II countries as is the case fc Group I countries; 
3. The level of international reserves is also much highe 
for Group II countries - nearly 10 times as much as th 
average for Group I countries; 
4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic produc 
however, Group I countries have much higher levels o 
attainment, averaging nearly twice as much as Group I 
countries in both 1970 and 1982. The debt servic· 
ratio to exports is correspondingly higher for Group countries. 
s. 
The rate of growth of imports was nearly 
higher over the 1970-82 period for Group II ten timei 
countries. 
In terms of profiles, therefore, the Group II countries are 
considerably larger, more affluent, and less reliant on 
external debt as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
They tend to spend relatively large amounts on military 
activities, but not on necessarily significantly greater 
amounts of their overall budgets. 
ANALYSIS OF PER CAPITA MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
The per capita military expenditure measure of military 
expenditure also confirmed the splitting of the developing 
country sample into two groups based on common economic 
environment. A factor analysis of the total sample of 
countries showed that per capita military expenditure loadPd 
only moderatelv on nno ~~-~--
TABLE 3 
OBL!OUE ROTATED FACTOR PATTERN: ECONOPIIC VARIABLES, l'IILITARY EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA. TOTAL COJNTRY SAl'IPLE 
Factors 
, 2 j 4 
5 5 
Factors Public International 
External GtoW1th Debt 
l'lili tary 
Af'fectin9 Consumption Reserve 
Debt/ in Service 
[)llpenditure 
Total Share 
Exports Consumption a• S of 
Per Capita 






Repayment of Principal on Public 
External Loans 1970 100* 
-l -S 0 
-26 9 -10 
Interest Payments on External Debt 1970 100* 
-1 -3 s 
-2J l -4 
Gross Inflow Public Loans 1970 94• 
-4 l J 
-6 l 29 
Total External Debt 1982 94• 
2 -1 3 
ll 16 3 
Grau Inflow External Loans 1982 89' 
6 -J l 
14 17 -13 
Public External 8orrOl!lin9 
C"""1i tments 1982 85* 
0 -4 6 
26 7 -8 
Total Public External Debt 1970 SJ• 
-9 -J 6 
-8 -17 34 
Interest Payments on Exter .Debt 1982 82* 
J 0 0 
ll 29 -ll 
Net INflow Public Exter .Loan• 1970 73• 
-6 7 4 
9 -4 54 
Repeyment of Prin.(xtern.Loans 1970 60• 0 
15 -3 27 
J7 1J 
Gross Domestic Product 1982 56• 
-11 39 -1 
8 -27 -19 
O> Growth of Experts 1970-82 
43• 22 J 
-JS -18 -14 
-4 
Current Account Balance 1970 -86* 
-1 J 14 8 
-8 0 -10 
Growth in Expert• 1960-70 15 
89' -16 -9 
s -4J -9 
Gross InflOl!I Public Loans/GOP l9B2 6 
B4' 0 26 
-2 0 -10 
Public Cons~tion as S GOP l9B2 -l 79• 
20 0 -19 
s 21 
External Public Debt S GOP l9B2 4 
76• -12 1S 
-8 14 8 
Experts S GOP 1982 -10 
72• 20 -9 
8 21 0 
Public Cons~tion S GOP 1960 -10 67• 
-S -11 • 16 
-10 J6 
Re5ource Balance S GDP 1982 21 -ss• 
12 -2J -9 
S6 -J 
Gros• National Product per Capita 1982 -7 6 
es• 0 -1J 
14 10 
Gross International Reserves 1982 
-· 
-14 84• -l 
16 -2J s 
Gross International Reserves 1970 l 7 
0 77• -10 
-10 -21 -17 
Current Account Balance 1982 -19 
0 -46• 8 
-1J 27 27 
Private Cons~tion as S GOP 1960 22 -9 
-62' -S s 
-27 -6 
Average l'laturity Public Extern.Debt 1982 -2 4 
-67• -9 0 
-25 2B 
Public External Borrowing Coornitments/ 
Exports l9B2 2 
2 -2 9S• 
3 -18 -10 
Gross Inflow Public External Loans/ 
Expert• 1982 s 
14 11 86• 
-7 J -1J 
Total Public External Debt/Exports 1982 s l 
-6 BB• -2 
-J 7 
Growth in Private Con•~tion l970-B2 -12 -12 8 
21 87• 
• 8 14 
Growth in I.,,orts l970-B2 10 
-J -2 -10 
eo• -20 -9 
Growth in Public Cons~tion l970/B2 0 B 
-2S -20 67• 
l -16 
Terms of Trade 1962 2J 
lB 24 6 
49• 7 18 
Debt Service S Exports l9B2 20 -2 
-4 -J -2 
73* 22 
Private Cons~tion S GOP 1982 -12 -JS 
-JS 4 -24 
.JS* -4 
Public External Debt S GOP 1970 -4 J 
-26 -J 6 
J1 51• 
Military E.xpendi tures per Capita 1981 7 
30 35 -10 
-17 9 56• 
TABLE 4 
OBLIQUE ROTArEO FACTOR PATTERN: ECONCJllIC VARIABLES 1 ~ILITARY EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA 1 GROUP l COUNTRIES 
Factors 
l 2 J 4 s 6 •• 7 
Determinants Public Repayment Public Growth Growth Public 
of l'lili tary Consunption of Public Debt/ in in External 
Expenditure as S External Experts Public Private Debt 
per Capita GOP Debt 1970 1962 Cons~tion Const.MnPtion I GOP 
Variables 19Bl 1970 
l'lili tar! Expenditure per Capita 1961 100* 7 -J5 -2 -ll 0 2 
Net Inf ow Public Ext. Loans 1970 96• e lb 2 .g -1 27 
Total Public External Debt 1962 94• -2 -6 14 10 12 2 
Gross International Re•erves 1982 92• -4 s -ll -14 6 -10 
Gros• National Prod.per Capital 1982 89• -13 -12 14 s -4 0 
Total Public External Debt 1970 86• 4 16 -J -10 -S 26 
Gross Inflow Public Loan• 1970 BJ• B 41 2 -7 -l 27 
Interest Payments on Extern.Debt 1982 e2• -J 6 l 34 7 -2 
Repayment of Principal on Public 
External Loans l9B2 7B* -3 4 0 2B 1J -22 
Gross International Reserves 1970 75* -9 12 -18 0 -12 -JO 
Gross Inflow Public Extern.Loans 1982 71• 2 24 12 15 5 -25 
Public Extern. Borrowin9 Conwni tments 69• 0 2J 10 9 9 -J2 
Gross Ocme•tic Product 1982 SJ* -J3 27 -6 -7 -14 -l 
.., Current Account Balance 1982 -10• 0 -29 s 7 -8 14 
Current ACcount Balance 1970 -87* 0 S1 J 2 14 -17 
Growth in Experts 1960-70 -22 95• B -4 -S l J 
Gross Inflow Public Ext.Loans/GOP 1982 -1J es• 19 19 16 -S -17 
Public Debt as S GOP 1982 
-12 BJ* 7 10 26 -6 7 
Public Con•unption a• S GOP 1960 10 B2• -12 -10 -22 20 -1 
Public Consunption as S GOP 1982 42 SB• -10 4 15 -21 -2 
Exports as S GOP l9B2 5 65• 3 0 49 -20 0 
Resource Balance a• S GOP 19B2 0 -71• 12 -16 SJ -12 16 
Repayment of Principal on Public 
External Loan• 1970 17 s 99" 1 0 --1 15 
Interest Payments on Public Ext.Debt 1970 21 9 95• -l 
-J -7 15 
Average l'laturity of Public Ext.Debt 1982 -10 ll 45• 26 -2J 0 13 
Public Debt/Exports 1982 4 l 0 94• -15 10 23 
Public Borrowing COll'mi tments/exports 1982 2 6 4 93• -26 ll 17 
Gross Inflow Public Ext.Loan•/Experts '82 0 8 ll B9* l -4 -4 
Growth of Experts l970-B2 J6 14 22 -41• -16 19 -9 
Growth of Public ConslJ01)tion 1970-B2 -J2 9 -ll -21 70' 24 9 
Debt Service Public External Debt as 
S Exports 1982 17 -J 16 -16 69• 21 -4 
Private ConslJ01)tion S GOP l9B2 
-13 -29 2 -2 -79• -J -8 
Growth of Experts 1970-82 0 s 74 -2 14 es• 2J 
Growth of Private ConslJ01)tion l970-B2 1J -14 -21 39 15 e2• 22 
Terms of Trade 1982 6 49 
-13 -4 28 47* l 
Private Consunption as S GOP 1960 
-3J -18 21 B J 24 72• Public External Debt S GOP 1970 JB 7 3 

































Interest Payments on Ext.P<Jblic Debt 100• -6 2 lD -1S -4 
Groos Inflow P<Jblic Loans l9B2 100* D 2 17 -5 7 
Total P<Jblic External Debt 1982 94• -l 3 4 1S 4 
Plblic External Borrowing 
COllll\itments l9B2 93• 2 -3 34 7 
Repayment of Principal on Public 
External Debt l97D 76• 3 -4 -JB 15 15 
Int.Payments on Ext.Public Debt l97D 69• 3 -14 -36 26 7 
Repay.of Ptin.on Public Ext.Debt 1962 69• -13 35 20 2D -ll 
Debt Service on External Debt as S 
Exports 1962 69• 9 30 -13 -5 -32 
Resource Balance l GOP l9B2 58* -35 9 -19 16 -14 
Current Account Balance 1970 -BB* -4 ll -12 -5 -2B 
Public Ext.Borrowing Commit./Exports 'B2 0 B2* -21 -l l -15 
Averege l'loturity Pl.ti.Ext.Debt l9B2 -42 77* -8 l 29 9 
Public External Debt/Exports l9B2 27 69* -l -45 19 -13 
Groos Inflow Public Loano//xports l9B2 31 66• B -33 -12 -9 
Terms of Tredo l9B2 43 -51* 2 26 22 -18 
Gross Oornestic Product l9B2 45 -59* -4B -10 17 9 
GNP Per Capita 1982 3 -71• lB o -36 -2B -l 
Gross International Reserves 19B2 -32 -73* -13 -14 29 -24 
Gross International Reserves 1970 0 -77* -16 -39 l 9 
Public Consunption as l GOP 1960 -26 -B JO• 17 34 17 
Plblic External Debt S GOP 1970 47 26 77• 0 6 0 
Exports S GOP l9B2 3 -23 68* 31 -9 28 
Gross Inflow P\Jblic Ext.Loans/GOP l9B2 38 21 66* 14 -17 14 
Public Consunption S GOP 1982 -19 6 6D* -23 -25 12 
l'lilitary Expend. Per Capita l9Bl -9 -31 57* -39 -14 32 
Current Account Balance 1982 -2J 44 48• -9 43 -7 
Private Consunption as l GOP 1982 -21 20 - 71 * 4 -9 22 
Growth in Imports 197D-B2 17 6 -13 88• -B -4 
Public Cons'-""tion Growth 1970-82 -2 35 0 81 * 7 O 
Private Conounption Growth l970-B2 14 -12 37 71* 12 -19 
Net Infl°" Public External Loans 1970 20 l 0 3 90* l 
Total Public External Loans 1970 19 6 -18 -18 75• 11 
Public External Debt S GOP 1970 8 ll 35 32 70* lO 
Groos Inflow Public Ext. Loans 1970 52 2 -2 -17 53• 8 
Growth in Experts 1960-70 -7 -6 24 l 12 B4* 
Growth in Exparto 1970-82 21 -7 20 -34 l 82* 
Private Cons'-""tion l GOP 1982 13 29 -47* lB 3 59* 
TABLE 6 
DETERfl'IIN8NTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA 
(St,f!ndardised Estimates) TOTAL COUNTRY SAMPLE 
Equation (MEP81) 
Independent Variables GNPPER CAB PCB ECNIA POPS EGB GDPB GEDB GOB l 0·32 0•75 (4•42) (10·15) 
2 0·29 0·75 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
Statistics 
PDB r2 F OF 
•730 67.84 52 0•21 (4·60) (12•06) (3·41) 
·834 72·12 46 
3 0·28 0•79 0•22 ' 0•19 (•·98) (13•82) (3•84) (3•38) 
•869 70·06 46 
4 0•23 0·76 0•31 0•17 
-0·14 (3•94) (13•47) (40:59) (3·21) (-2·06l 
·882 61·22 46 
5 0·26 0•77 0·29 0•14 
-0·12 0•12 (4·52) (14•27) (4•40) (2·66) (-l ·86) (2•29) 
·896 57·19 46 
6 0·28 0·78 0•22 0•17 0·03 (4·78) (12•20) (3·23) (2·41) (0•43) 
•870 55•08 45 
7 0·63 0·29 
00:33 ( 7·71) (3·09) 
(3•66) 
•787 40•83 36 
8 0•83 0•30 
-0·28 (4•91) (2·55) 
(-1·66) 
•697 27·71 39 
9 0•28 0•78 0·22 
0•13 
(4·67) (12•71) (3•69) 
(2•11) 
·850 59•51 46 
10 0•22 0•75 0·33 
-0·17 
0·12 
(3·61) (12•51) (4•43) (-2·26) 
(2•13) 
·865 53·36 46 
Notes: See text for definition of variables ( ) = t statistic 
r2 
= correlation coefficient F 
= F statistic 
OF 
= degrees of freedom 
TABLE 7 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, GRouP II COUNTRIES 
Actual/ 
Country Actual Predicted 
Predicted Placement 
1. Rwanda 3·962 
164·274 ·0241 
Below 
2. India 7·360 
64·3B6 ·1143 
Below 
3. Colunbia 13·759 
110·325 ·1247 Below 
4. Indonesia 1B•5Bl 
147·319 ·1261 
Below 
5. Plexico 16·634 
110·519 ·1505 
Below 
6. Thailand 27·413 
136·B67 ·2003 
Below 
7. Philippines 16·792 
52·B17 ·3179 
Below 
B. Algeria 91·959 
222·219 ·413B 
Below 
9. Venezuela 62·663 
130·375 ·4B06 
Below 
10. Spain 96·693 
133·193 ·7260 
Below 
11. Argentina 111·010 
127·112 ·B733 
Below 
12. Kuwait B36·000 
B70·24B ·9606 
13. Korea 103·666 
105•4BB ·9B27 
14. Saudi a Arabia 2110·000 
1956·000 1·07B7 
Above 
15. Malaysia 101·119 
74·901 1·3500 
Above 
16. Greece 265·773 
194·039 1•3697 
Above 
17· Jordon 273·125 
1B9·901 1·43B2 
Above 




Based on regression equation : 
l'IEPBl = 0·21 GNPPER + 0·91CAB 
Below = Countries whose Actual 
is less than 95~ of Predicted value 
Above = Countries whose Actual 
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just a single variable, public external debt as a per cent 
of gross domestic product in 1970. Jn sharp contrast, a 
factor analysis of Group I countries produced a loading of 
100 on the factor depicting various measures of external 
public debt (Table 4). In contrast, Group II countries 
loaded fairly heavily on a factor other than that obtained 
in the total sample and one that did not represent external 
public debt in the 1980s. Military expenditures per capita 
for Group II loaded (Table 5) relatively high at 57 on a 
factor representing the balance of payments, exports and 
public consumption, suggesting that the better the export 
position of the country and the more expansive the public 
sector in increasing its consumption, the greater the level 
of military expenditure per capita. 
Regressions on per capita military expenditure in 1981 using 
the total sample (Table 6) indicated that three variables -
gross national product per capita (GNPPER), the current 
account in 1982 (CAB) and the share of public consumption in 
gross domestic product for 1982 (PCB) account for over 83 
per cent of the fluctuations in that measure of military 
expenditure. Net capital inflows (CMA) in 1970 are also 
statistically significant and positive, as is the external 
public debt in 1982 (PDB). However, while the overall 
regression results appear satisfactory, in terms of the r2, 
the F statistic and t statistic on individual independent 
variables, the best regression equation (Equation 4 Table 6) 
was able to predict only saudi Arabia's per capita military 
expenditures within 5 per cent of the actual value (Table 
7). 
In contrast, the results for Group I countries (Table Bl 
show a pattern much different from that obtained from the 
total sample. In addition to gross national product per 
capita (GNPPER), the government deficit (GOB) as a per cent 
of GDP in 1982 is highly significant but negative. 
countries in the Group I environment have large government 
deficits apparently used in part to increase military 
expenditures. The share of defence (GEDB) in the overall 
government budget is, however, positive and statistically 
significant, as are the net capital (ECNIA) flows in 1970 
and the public debt in 1982 (PDBl. Interestingly, the 
current account of the balance of payments (CAB) is 
statistically significant but in contrast to Group II 
countries below, the sign is negative. 
One can only speculate at this point, but it appears that 
Group I countries' external borrowings are in part used to 
finance military expenditures, as are government deficits, 
while any improvement in the current account of the balance 
of payments is appropriated by the private sector for non-
defence-related expenditures, and/or by the public sector 
for external debt servicing or non-military related imports. 
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GNPPER PCB GEDB GOP 
l MEP=Bl O•B9 0•46 0•66 (4·23) (2•65) (3·16) 
2 O•BB 0•43 0•91 -5·00 (5•42) (3•35) (4·88) (-3·16) 
3 0·91 0•38 0•49 
-0·75 
(4•80) (4•47) (2·46) (-2·15) 
4 1·71 0•38 0•76 -4·66 (6·20) (3·78) (4·93) (-3·81) 
5 1•62 0•40 0•58 
-4·51 
(6·66) (4·57) (3·46) (-4·24) 
6 1•91 0•28 1·00 
-6·81 
(5·93) (2•47) (5·28) (-3·69) 
Notes: See text for definition of variables 
( ) = t statistic 
r 2 = correlation coefficient 
F = F statistic 












EB CAB r2 F OF 
·726 7•96 12 
·887 ll•OB 12 
·843 7·54 12 





·964 19•41" 12 
·726 7·96 12 
DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, NON-LATIN Al'llERICAN COUNTRIES, ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
(~tandardised Estimates) 
Equation Independent Variables 
GNPPER PCB GEDB PDB 









0·65 0·30 0·23 
(6·34) (2·71) (2·13) 
0•67 0·35 0•13 0•18 
(6•67) (3•14) (1'10) (2•62) 
0·32 0•20 0·20 






(5•7B) (l ·77) 
See text for definition of variables ( ) = t statistic 
r 2 = correlation coefficient 
F = F statistic 









GDP GOB r2 F OF 
•441 43•48 56 
·716 22•74 30 
•742 18·74 31 
·862 58·22 41 
·857 52·73 39 
0·15 
(2•07) ·841 48·89 41 
-0·45 
(-2·51) ·738 26·29 31 
different from that of the sample whole (Table 9). Two 
variables, the gross national product per capita (GNPPER) 
and the current account of the balance of payments (CAB) 
account for over 92 per cent of the fluctuation in the per 
capita military expenditure. The government budget surplus 
as a per cent of GNP in 1982 (GOB) together with the share 
of public consumption in 1982 (PCB) also contribute 
positively to the regression equation. In addition to gross 
national product per capita, these two variable account for 
over 95 per cent of the fluctuation in per capita military 
expenditures. The high correlation between the current 
account balance (CAB) and government budget position (GOB) 
precluded including both variables in the regression 
equation. Nevertheless, a c!ear contrast appears between 
this group and Group I. Group II countries appear to 
maintain much stronger balance of payments positions and are 
in a position to expand military expenditures when either 
the current account improves or the government budget 
improves. These countries do not.necessarily have to resort 
to external loans or inf lows of capital to increase 
expenditures in defence-related activities. All measures of 
external debt - absolute totals or as a proportion of GNP 
were statistically insignificant in accounting for 
fluctuations in military expenditures per capita. 
Examining countries on a regional basis also provides 
further insights as to the relative importance of economic 
variables in affecting per capita military expenditures. 
For example, an analysis of the Latin American sample (Table 
10) indicates that gross national product per capita 
(GNPPER), the share of public consumption in GDP (PCB), the 
share of military expenditures in the total government 
budget (GEDB), together with the public external debt in 
1970 (PDA) and 1982 (PDB) are all positively related to this 
measure of military expenditure and statistically 
significant. Gross domestic product (GDP) was, however, 
negatively related to per capita military expenditures. 
In contrast, the non-Latin American countries (Table lll 
followed a pattern similar to the total sample, except that 
government budget surplus/deficit had a negative sign, 
indicating that this group of countries resorts more to 
budget deficits as a means of increasing military 
expenditure. 
In summary, the basic regression equation for total military 
expenditures per capita shows the following differences by 
sample group: . 
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+ 0 + 
+ + 0 
w_here GNPPER = per capita gross cu t national prod t 
- rren acount balance, 1982 . P _ uc , 1982; CAB as a per cent of GDP 1982.' CB - government consumption 
debt, 1982; GOB = gove~nment d f PD~ = total public external 
of GNP, 1981; GEDB = share of e ~c~t (surplus) as a per cent 
government budget, 1981 ; and mili:ary e~penditure in total 1970. PDA - public external debt in 
CONCLUSIONS 
While only a first step . . . cap·t ·1· in examining the det . i_a mi itary expenditures th erm1nants of per con~1d7rable light on the four e abov7 analysis did throw 




w at least on a er . Wagner's La ( 
appears to be valid for developin oss-sect1onal basis) 
per capita military e . g countries; that is, 
line with increases in ~~end1t~res_tend to increase in 
appears valid whether de~ ~ap~ta income. This result 
as a whole, on a broad re 7 oping c~untries are examined 
non-Latin America) or bg1donal basis (Latin America and 
(rel t
. ' Y egree of reso 
a ively financially co . urce constraint 
On the other hand, per can~~~a7ned or unconstrained). 
for only a relatively :small inco~e tends to account ~luctuations in per ca it~ropo~t~on of the observed 
irrespective of the group ~sed. m1l1tary expenditures 
Public external debt does sig~ificant role in expanding a~p7ar to have played a 
capita, particularly amo m1l1tary expenditures per 
with limited alternat· ng those countries (Group I) 
While not tested here1ve.:ources of foreign exchange. 
number of developing c~un~ri::y be assumed that, for a 
public external debt accu 1 ' a high proportion of the 
to significantly expand ~~-:ted by 1982 had been used 
.capita basis. mi 1 ary expenditures on a per 
With regard to the uni formit f d . the above analysis c y o . e~eloping countries, 
structural differences ~early indicates significant 
expenditures in the poorei c~untry t~pe. Military 
been to a large extent fac~l'tess dynamic countries has 
borrowing and domestic pub~.i ~ted ~y public external 
afl"luent and dynamic LDCs ~<;= hefic1ts; while the more 
related activities relied lw icl spent more on military 
and budgetary surpluses :rge y on balance of payments 
o expand their per capita 
19 
military expenditure. 
I. Significant regional differences in military 
expenditures may exist, but these differences do not 
appear to be as pronounced as those occurring between 
the resource constrained and unconstrained countries. 
Because of the small sample size for certain regions 
(i.e., Middle East and south Asia) it was impossible to 
provide a definitive answer as to the usefulness of a 
regional approach to explaining the observed patterns of 
military expenditures. 
5. Most importantly, the analysis above indicated the 
usefulness of examining per capita military expenditures 
from an economic perspective. Despite the wide 
diversity of political and strategic situations in our 
sample of developing countries, economic variables were 
shown to account for the bulk of differences in per 
capita military expenditures across countries. 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calfornia, USA 
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